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Abstract 
 
The paper explains why across Europe very few job matches are facilitated by 
public employment services (PES), looking at the existence of a double-sided 
asymmetric information problem on the labour market. It is argued that  although a 
PES potentially reduces search costs, both employers and employees have strong 
incentives not to use the PES. The reason is that employers try to avoid the „worst‟ 
employees, and employees try to avoid the „worst‟ employers. Therefore PES get 
caught in a low-end equilibrium that is almost impossible to escape. The mechanisms 
leading to this low-end equilibrium are illustrated by means of qualitative interviews 
with 40 private employers in six European countries.   
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Introduction1 
 
Between the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century most 
European countries established some kind of national labour exchanges, which 
mainly were occupied with job broking, i.e. to match workers with employers2. The 
creation of Public Employment Service (PES) was promoted in 1919 by the newly 
formed International Labour Organisation (ILO) through the adoption of 
conventions that recommended the abolition of private agencies and the 
development of a national-based system of job brokerage under the state control 
(Thuy et al. 2001)3. According to the ILO, the main aim of public employment 
offices was to protect workers from abuses and malpractices of some employers and 
private employment agencies which profited from their position to exploit 
uninformed jobseekers. The employers also had an interest in placing job broking in 
a “neutral” state institution. If the task was taken by the unions they could exploit 
this position. However despite the consensus about PES these institutions have 
always been debated; especially their ability to be effective job brokers has been 
contested (Thuy et el 2001:41).  
In recent decades there has especially been a strong focus on the organisational 
structure of the PES. One way to frame it is that the creation of PES at the turn of 
20th century was an attempt to correct “market failures” in job matching, whereas 
contemporary changes are an attempt to correct the failures of public authorities in 
the governance of labour market intermediation (Mosley and Speckesser 1997). Thus, 
since the mid-1990s, the role and the nature of public employment offices have 
undergone a profound change, in particular along three main aspects. Firstly, a 
liberalization of service delivery, which in most countries put an end to the state 
monopoly in job brokerage4. Secondly, a decentralization of competence in the field 
of jobseeker assistance to local governments. Thirdly, a moving from a bureaucratic 
type of organization towards customer-oriented services and the promotion of a 
stricter integration between jobseekers assistance and unemployment benefit 
administration (Walwei 1996; Clasen and Clegg 2006). It seems to be a shared 
assumption in all these reform attempts that both the key to understand the failure of 
the PES and the key to improve the PES lies in the organization setup.  
By contrast, this paper provides an explanation of PES‟ failure by theorising on 
the „nature‟ of the labour market in which PES work. The paper is organized into 
seven sections. In the first section we present our theoretical explanation of the 
failure of PES in job-brokering. In the following sections this rational-choice 
argument will be illustrated by means of qualitative interviews with 40 private 
employers from six European countries. After the introduction of the data, the third, 
fourth and fifth sections describe the limited use of PES and the general mistrust in 
PES. Section six illustrates seeming exceptions to the rule, i.e. employers that actually 
indicate that they use PES, and section seven shows how negative experiences often 
hinder the establishment of a good reputation for PES. The last section summarises 
our main conclusions and discusses implications for PES. Unfortunately we do not 
have new data that can illustrate the theoretical points from the standpoint of 
employees. But the theoretical argument does fit previous results on the behaviour of 
employees (Ebert and Holzer 2004).   
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Double-sided asymmetric information and ‘lemons’ on the labour 
market 
 
As a point of departure, economic reasoning about the „nature‟ of the labour 
market provides us with arguments that speak in favour of PES. Contemporary 
economists broadly agree with have  recognized that labour markets deviate 
considerably from the simple neoclassical, competitive-market model presented in 
textbooks (Adnett 1987). With the heterogeneity of both workers and working 
conditions (wage, working time, location, etc), labour markets are characterised by 
limited and incomplete information, which makes rapid job matches really difficult. 
Still, PES could in theory play a role in gathering extensive local knowledge about 
employers and the employees. However, employers and employees are looking not 
only for information but above all for trustworthy information. Employers have 
difficulty foreseeing whether an employee will work hard, will cause trouble, or soon 
quit the job. Only the jobseeker may know this, but at the same time, he or she has a 
clear incentive to present him- or herself as reliable and productive. This is a classic 
case of asymmetrically distributed information. And the mechanism also works the 
other way around: the employer has a clear incentive to present the workplace as a 
place with good work conditions, nice colleagues and good career opportunities, 
even if this is no the case. This situation, where both the employer and the 
jobseekers are in lack of trustworthy information, can be labelled the double-sided 
asymmetric information problem of the labour market (Larsen 2009).  
This double-sided asymmetric information problem clearly affects labour-market 
exchange. In rational choice theory, a classic solution to asymmetric information 
involves a „third party‟, such as a public authority, that can provide some guarantee of 
the quality of the exchange. For example, the state sometimes guarantees that food 
sold as „organic‟ is indeed organic. In this case the consumer cannot know and the 
farmer has a clear incentive to use such a label (here the information is asymmetric). 
Therefore a trustworthy third party is needed. However, it is almost impossible for 
PES to be perceived as a trustworthy third party. This is mainly because of four 
interconnected problems. 
The first problem is that PES are required to help all kinds of jobseekers, 
especially „those who might otherwise be disadvantaged in the labour market‟ (Thuy 2001, p. 
xvi). But exactly due to this requirement the employers cannot trust the PES to 
propose quality labour. And the other way around, the PES are also required to help 
all kind of employers and often also those who cannot find enough labour. Therefore 
the employees also cannot fully trust the PES.  
The second problem is that all unemployed are typically required to register at 
PES in order to receive unemployment benefits. This is problematic because the 
unemployed are typically perceived as „lemons‟ (see below). The „lemon‟ term, and 
the mechanisms of markets in lemons, is described by Akerlof in his famous paper 
about used cars (1970). The logic is that the owner knows something about the car 
which the buyers do not know, e.g. whether it is a lemon (a badly assembled car) or 
not. And the owner has a clear incentive to hide the fact if the car actually is a lemon. 
Therefore buyers are extremely cautious when buying a used car and the  prices for 
(true) lemons are often suspiciously low. The low prices often make owners of good 
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cars to withdraw their cars from the market. Thereby the share of lemons on the 
market increases, which makes buyers even more sceptical. The predicted result is 
that in the end only lemons will be on this market (see e.g. Rasmussen 1991). 
The same logic applies to labour markets. A number of studies have shown that 
it is much easier to find jobs for unemployed from a closed down workplace than for 
unemployed from a workplace that has only reduced the workforce a little (Gibbons 
& Katz 1991, Frederiksen et al. 2006). The argument is that in the latter case, the new 
employer will suppose that the former employers have probably fired the least 
productive workers in their workforce, whereas in the case of company closure, more 
productive workers will also be among the unemployed. Similarly, since the 
employers know that PES have many potential lemons in their databases, they will 
try to avoid hiring through PES. A PES might tell an employer that they now have a 
good worker available. But the employer cannot trust the PES, knowing that PES 
have a special obligation to help the worst-off. Therefore PES become a last resort 
for getting labour. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 The PES‟s vicious circle 
 
 
The third problem is that it is not only a matter of changing the perceptions 
employers might have of PES. The non-use of PES is underpinned by the reluctant 
behaviour of stronger groups of workers. These jobseekers know that PES are often 
considered a last resort for recruitment and will suspect them of having many bad 
jobs in their databases, for employers too can be described as „lemons‟. So using PES 
also becomes a sub-optimal solution for jobseekers. Therefore only the weaker 
categories of workers will use them, which, as in Akerlof‟s example, increases the 
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„lemon problem‟. So PES are trapped in a self-reinforcing vicious circle that appears 
impossible to break (figure 1). As already mentioned, illustrating the non-use of PES 
by stronger job-seekers is outside the scope of this paper. However, the theoretical 
argument is backed by studies which show that most workers and even most 
unemployed do not use PES as the primary search channel. And those who do use 
PES typically end up with lower salaries (cf. Ebert and Holzer 2004). 
 
The fourth problem is that many employers and employers can „meet‟ through 
informal recruitment channels which mitigate the risks of double-sided asymmetric 
information (Granovetter 1995). One of the standard arguments for recruitment 
through networks are that it is quick and cheap. However it is also of importance 
that networks can deliver trustworthy information, especially in the case where 
workers already employed function as a third party between employers and 
jobseekers. This recruitment channel is known in the literature as the „extended 
internal labour market‟ (Jenkins 1984; Adnett 1987). When employers hire through 
an already employed worker the latter can provide trustworthy information about the 
new worker (given the assumption that the already employed worker wants to 
maintain a good relationship with the employer). This solves one side of the 
asymmetric information problem. Furthermore, a new worker will probably trust the 
information given by an already employed friend (given the assumption that the 
already employed wants to maintain a good friendship). This solves the other side of 
the asymmetric information problem. Thus, these kinds of networks are perfect for 
avoiding „lemons‟ among workers and employers. And it is easy to understand why it 
is difficult for the PES to compete with this recruitment channel: our qualitative 
interviews with employers clearly indicate that informal networks are by far the most 
preferred recruitment channels.  
These four interconnected problems lead to the very pessimistic prediction that, 
in terms of job-brokering, PES will always end up as a last resort for both employers 
and jobseekers. However, the rational-choice perspective does offer one theoretical 
possibility to escape the low-end equilibrium in which PES are caught: that is, to 
„invest‟ in a good reputation. The argument is that, if non-trustworthy players in 
various „games‟ behave trustworthily, then they will gain a good reputation. Such a 
reputation might even work when a new player enters the game. The reason is that a 
good reputation can quickly be lost, and the new player may think that the other 
player will not risk their  hard-won reputation by cheating in the next game. In the 
market for used cars again, if a car dealer has established a good reputation, a 
customer will probably expect that he will not risk losing this reputation by selling 
lemons. 
It is, however, difficult for the whole PES system of a country to establish a 
good reputation. Besides the real existence of lemons, the problem is that it is very 
difficult to make known plausibly that PES will „screen for lemons‟ among the 
unemployed and among employers. In practice, local employment offices and their 
front-line personal might try to create a good reputation among local employers by 
not „selling lemons‟ to them. If they do so for a period of time, the employers may 
begin to trust them (because they know the local PES will not want to risk losing this 
reputation). It is more difficult to „screen for lemons‟ among employers and thereby 
create a good reputation among workers looking for jobs. Naturally,  PES do have 
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mechanisms to penalise the unemployed who do not engage in a facilitated job 
match, which reduces the importance for PES of having a good reputation among 
the unemployed. But as we shall see in the following sections, these penalties (which 
in most countries have been strengthened within the last decade) not only discredit 
PES among workers, but also make it harder to convince employers that PES can 
effectively screen workers.   
  
 
Exploring practices and perceptions among private employers in six 
European countries  
 
In the following sections we illustrate the consequences of the double-sided 
asymmetric information problem by means of semi-structured interviews with 40 
private employers conducted in Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Slovenia and 
Switzerland in early 2009. Comparative information in the field is sparse, but data 
collected in the 2001 ISSP survey (International Social Survey Program) documents 
the limited use of PES in these countries. The share of workers that heard about 
their job through PES ranges from three percent in Switzerland to twelve percent in 
West Germany. In the other four countries the share was four percent in Hungary, 
five percent in Denmark, six percent in Italy and ten percent in Slovenia (Romani & 
Larsen 2010). Thus, despite variations it is clear that no country has established a 
PES with large market shares. The interviews lasted approximately one hour each 
and were based on a common semi-structured interview guide. They were conducted 
by partners within the RECWOWE network (see acknowledgment notes) in national 
languages and afterward translated into English. The country selection gave us a 
variation in terms of business cycles, employment protection legislation, 
unemployment benefit generosity and labour exchange regulations, but we expected 
the mechanism caused by doubled-sided asymmetric information to be present in all 
six countries. Besides the broad representation of different countries, the strength of 
this data material is that it provides qualitative insights into the recruitment practices 
of private employers and their perception of PES. The employers were not randomly 
selected. We selected companies in the industrial and service sector, focusing the 
interviews on the recruitment of low-skilled workers. This was optimal for the study 
of PES, since they have a larger market share in this sector of the labour market than 
among educated-worker segments, because such companies are usually active in very 
price-competitive markets, where we can assume that the role of PES may be of 
more importance, as it could reduce the cost of getting labour. However, we can also 
assume that this market is probably troubled by the fact (or perception) that the 
chance of hiring a lemon is higher since the needed unskilled labour has not been 
screened by the educational system (see e.g. Spence 1973). Finally, our focus on 
employers of unskilled labour is of special relevance because it is these companies 
that are most likely to be open to long-term unemployed, which PES often have a 
special obligation to help. In the next section, we start with a basic overview of how 
these 40 employers typically recruit (see appendix A and B for a further introduction 
to the data and the interview guide). 
 
 
Larsen, Vesan:  The failure of placement of low-skill workers     11  
 
The non-use of public employment services  
 
The private employers were asked what channels they used to recruit unskilled 
labour. The interviewer emphasised that it was not so much a matter of publicising 
job openings as of how the first contact typically was established. The most-used 
recruitment channel was found to be a waiting list or direct application. Fifteen 
employers „very often‟ used this channel and eighteen „often‟ used it (together 83 
percent). This channel probably includes what Atkinson (1985) labelled the „second 
peripheral group‟ of a company. These workers create numerical flexibility of the 
company, i.e. the company can rapidly reduce or increase the number of employees. 
Those in the second peripheral group often handle twilight shifts, overlaid shifts, 
peak manning etc. The point is that some of these workers and companies already 
know each other, which reduces the doubled-sided asymmetric information problem. 
The second most-used recruitment channel was contact through the employers‟ 
current workers. Nine of the companies „very often‟ used this channel and 21 „often‟ 
used it (together 75 percent). There can be a number of advantages to using this 
channel (e.g. it is cheap and quick), but as argued above it is also the best way to 
deliver trustworthy information to both the employer and the applicant and thereby 
reduce both sides of the information problem. The other recruitment channels 
mentioned by the interviewer were much less used. Around one-third of the 
companies answered that they „very often‟ or „often‟ recruited through private 
employment agencies, public employment agencies or „other contacts in the sector‟. 
The least-used channels were newspapers and Internet sources. These were used by 
only around one-fifth of the companies.  
The overall picture is that, for these companies, PES are positioned in-between 
the preferred informal channels (waiting lists/direct applicants and a company‟s own 
employees) and non-preferred formal channels (newspapers and on-line job boards). 
Still, most of the companies did not use the public employment services. The 
qualitative interviews clearly demonstrate that most employers do perceive the PES 
as a last resort. This seems to be the case for employers across countries, sectors, and 
different sizes. Our data confirm what was observed from the ISSP survey, namely 
that Germany and Slovenia seem to be most favourable to PES. Larger companies 
also seemed to be a little more inclined to use the PES, which might be explained by 
the fact that a larger company can more easily deal with the risk of employing a 
„lemon‟. The theoretical argument here is that you are more risk-averse if you can 
only buy one car than if you buy hundreds of cars at a time. Nevertheless, the human 
resource director of a large German cleaning company (with around 2500 employees) 
stated that „when we are looking for staff, we find someone relatively quickly through word of 
mouth…. We do not inform the public employment agency more often because we don’t have any 
need to‟. Similarly, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a Swiss cleaning company 
(180 employees) stated that „we can do without it, because we have a lot of direct applications 
and our current employees often recommend the company to people who are looking for work‟. 
Therefore, one simple explanation for the failure of the PES might naturally be that 
these employers do not feel a need for this free service. But there is more to it than 
that. 
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The negative perceptions of the unemployed sent by PES  
 
The qualitative interviews clearly indicated that most employers are suspicious 
about persons sent by PES. The situation is naturally worst where the employers 
believe that the labour market provides good job opportunities. The CEO of a Swiss 
construction company (200 employees) stated that „if the person needs the help of the public 
employment agency, it means that he is not able to find a job by himself. You can leave a job at 8 
am and find a new one at 10 am, if you are a good worker‟. The same argument was made by 
a director of a Swiss chain of cafes (180 employees): „In this field there is plenty of occasion 
to find a job, especially if the person has previous experience in the field. So if someone has not found 
anything for a long period of time there has to be a problem in addition to job loss – most frequently 
lack of motivation‟. This negative perception is confirmed also by the co-owner of a 
German laundry company (75 employed), who stated: „I have the impression that most 
people who register with the public employment agency are looking for work but maybe do not want 
to work or even cannot work‟. In the same vein, the day manager of a Danish meat 
factory (350 employees) declared that: „Personally I do not believe that it is a seal of approval 
to have gone through that system [i.e. PES]… If you are interested in working you would come here 
and apply. If you have already been to the employment office it is almost as if you have been forced to 
come down here.‟  
Therefore, our interviews confirmed that job applicants coming directly from 
PES are often perceived as not being motivated. Moreover, besides the motivation 
issue, there is also the question of the trustworthiness of the individuals provided by 
PES. Especially in the service sector we find employers concerned with this question. 
An owner of a small Hungarian cleaning company states that „Cleaning is a very 
confidential type of job. There might be valuable objects and money in the offices. I am not sure I 
could trust a person sent by the public employment agency‟. The same argument is put forward 
by the owner of a small Hungarian supermarket. Asked about why PES are not used 
more often, the answer was „because these jobs are completely based on trust. This is typically a 
case where you need to hire people who are the acquaintances of somebody. You cannot hire a 
complete stranger. Only somebody by recommendation. The job itself requires that‟. 
The problem with non-observable characteristics is a general problem on the 
labour market, but the negative perception of the job motivation of the unemployed 
naturally increases the importance of a screening procedure. And here the PES faces 
yet another problem. The employers do not have much confidence in the ability of 
the PES to distinguish between motivated and non-motivated workers. And even if 
PES were able to pre-screen applicants, the employers might doubt that the PES 
were telling the truth.  
 
 
The low trustworthiness of information given by PES 
 
In the interviews we tried to measure the level of trust employers had in the 
information provided by PES. The employers were asked how important a positive 
recommendation from PES and other sources was for the employment chances of an 
(unskilled) worker. As expected, the highest importance was attributed to 
recommendations from employers‟ own employees: 59 percent answered that this 
was of „very high or high importance‟. This confirms the role played by networks in 
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delivering trustworthy information on the labour market. Another common source 
of recommendations are former employers. Here we asked about both oral and 
written recommendations from former employers. The interviewed employers 
indicated that oral recommendations are of higher importance than written 
recommendations: 13 percent answered of „very high importance‟ and 24 percent 
answered of „high importance‟. By contrast, written recommendations were said to 
be of „very high‟ importance for five percent and of high importance for 17 percent. 
This divide has also been found in previous studies (Pedersen 2009), and a possible 
explanation is that face-to-face interactions increase the trustworthiness of 
recommendations.  
Most important for our purpose is the finding that the employers clearly put less 
emphasis on recommendations given by PES. None of the employers answered that 
such a recommendation is of „very high importance‟ and only eight percent indicated 
„high importance‟. The interviews also indicated a divide between private and public 
employment agencies: Employers have more trust in the recommendations given by 
private agencies; 11 percent indicated „very high importance‟ and 29 indicated „high 
importance‟.   
Following our rational-choice argument, we can focus on two problems which 
further explain the low value of recommendations given by PES. The first problem is 
that employers are aware that PES have to enforce the conditionality of 
unemployment benefits checking the conduct of benefit recipients. This task makes 
it difficult for PES to observe the true job motivation of unemployed. The director 
of the Swiss café chain suggested, for example, that „...unemployed tend to have two 
discourses and attitudes: one when the person from the public employment agency is present and 
another when he is gone‟. The same opinion was also put forward by the director of the 
Hungarian cleaning company: „I do not know what percentages of the people who turn up at the 
public employment really want to work. When I was queuing at the public employment agency, I was 
listening to the conversations of other unemployed [note - the employer had once experienced 
himself a period of unemployment] and they were not focused on how to find a job, but rather 
how to remain unemployed and receive the unemployment benefit, how they might refuse the job offers 
and remain unemployed. I do not want to employ somebody who is working only by constraint‟. 
Naturally the validity of these observations can be questioned, but it is easy to follow 
how employers can come to have the perception that it is difficult for PES to assess 
the amount of true job motivation of the unemployed.  
The second problem is that even if PES were able to distinguish between the 
motivated and non-motivated, they might not tell the truth to the employers. This 
line of reasoning is clearly confirmed by our qualitative analysis. A manager of a 
Danish cake factory (50 employees) admitted that ‘.. I also fear that they will give me the 
one that they want to get rid of the most, if I contact the public employment agency.‟ The director 
the Swiss café chain also claimed that PES „... are not reliable enough. They tend to hide 
things in order to successfully reinsert an unemployed‟. Again, one can naturally discuss the 
validity of this perception, as most of the interviewed employers do not use PES. 
Nevertheless, one of the few companies that „very often‟ recruit through the PES, a 
Swiss supermarket chain (7500 employees), actually seems to experience this 
problem. The deputy head of the human resources department stated that „…our 
main complaint is that sometimes public agencies tend to make a really quick placement and tend to 
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hide some elements of the beneficiary‟. Nevertheless, whether the PES deliver trustworthy 
information or not, it is easy to understand that the employers are suspicious.  
 
 
Exceptions to the rule  
 
In general our interviews support the theoretical argument that it is very difficult 
for the PES to act as a job-broker. However, there also seem to be a few exceptions 
to the rule. Five employers actually stated that they „very often‟ recruit through PES. 
These exceptions could reveal how the PES manage to escape the low-end 
equilibrium. But a closer look at the interviews with these employers does not leave 
much hope for PES. Two of these employers were actually referring to specific 
services addressed to disabled jobseekers. The other three employers are located in 
Slovenia where it is compulsory to report vacancies to the PES. This factor could 
reduce – in principle – the perception that the PES only serves bad employers, i.e., 
one side of the asymmetric information problem is remedied. However, the 
interviews clearly indicate that Slovenian employers remain very suspicious of the 
quality of labour provided by PES. This negative perception is also confirmed by 
employers in Hungary, the second country involved in our analysis where job 
vacancy reporting is mandatory. According to the literature, in fact, compulsory 
vacancy-notification has not proved successful across Europe, since – instead of  
increasing employer‟s trust in PES – it is perceived by firms as just a further 
administrative burden (Kuddo 2009). 
Another seven companies answered that they „often‟ recruit through the PES. 
But again a closer reading of the interviews clearly reveals that in these companies  
PES are definitely not the preferred channels of recruitment. We only found one case 
where the employer used the PES „often‟ and seemed to be satisfied. This was an 
Italian company (120 employees) that produces plastic car components. Besides 
using PES, this director of the human resources department actually stated that a 
recommendation from the PES was of „high importance‟; even of higher importance 
than a recommendation from own employees. But in fact, in reporting his seemingly 
successful collaboration with PES, the Italian employer was not referring to low-skill 
workers: „…unlike what usually happens, we turn to public employment offices not when we need 
to employ a high number of workers but when we need specific professional figures, i.e. when we need 
more targeted selections. In this case, public employment offices make a first selection of candidates, 
who are then evaluated by us. This allows us to save time and energies‟. Thus, part of the secret 
might be that this employer does not ask the PES to find standard labour – whereby 
they might end up getting a lemon – but ask the PES to find a specific professional 
profile. The same seems to be the case for a German employer who was also satisfied 
with PES (though the company „rarely‟ recruits through this channel); ‘We only address 
the agency if we need skilled workers. … We name and explain our requests. The public 
employment agency gets a profile, so that they know exactly which workers we are looking for’. 
Another part of the secret is that some PES, according to the Italian and German 
employer, have competent people that manage to make a good pre-selection.    
This could support the theoretical argument that PES might after all be able to 
build a reputation enabling them to be seen as a trustworthy third party. However, to 
judge from the experiences of the Italian employer, this reputation seems very much 
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to be that of the individual caseworker and not of the PES organisation as such. As 
noted by this employer: ‘public employment offices have changed during the years…. The services 
they offer have much improved but there is still a long way to go…. Unfortunately, their performance 
is still too dependent on single individual‟. The same can be found in other interviews; e.g., 
the human resources director of an Italian catering firm (970 employees) states that 
„…some public employment offices offer very good services, whereas others do not. According to me, 
this depends on the persons which work there and on the relationship that we manage to establish‟. 
Thus, employers might develop trust in a specific caseworker, which creates the 
possibility of collaboration. But the problem here is that reputation, when it works, 
remains fragile, as one bad experience might be enough to spoil it. Theoretically, it is 
exactly because it is fragile that it works. 
  
 
The fragile reputation and negative experiences  
 
The fragility of PES‟ reputation clearly emerges in the interviews: those few 
employers who had used PES had negative experiences. As stated by the human 
resources director at a Danish company that produces parts for windmills (603 
employees): the PES ‘have to try to get them [i.e. the unemployed] out of the system as 
quickly as possible. But it does not take a great deal of bad recruitments before we lose our patience‟. 
Negative experiences with PES are often caused by the lack of a good job 
attitude among applicants. A German employer in the food sector (780 employees) 
told for example this story about people sent from the local PES: ‘I remember that in 
the past, during summer, we often employed workers for two or three months during the vacation 
time. Some of them worked just a day, or didn’t show up at all‟. Bad experiences can also 
originate in a careless selection of job candidates. A Slovenian cleaning firm reported 
that once the PES sent 30 applicants for one job position, which was perceived to be 
too many, while a German employer (supermarket, 89 employees) reported that 
„…just recently, I had two applicants from the public employment agency who hardly spoke 
German. How can the employment agency propose people – in retail where communication plays 
an important role – who haven’t mastered the language?‟ Finally, some companies simply had 
problems with the bureaucratic procedures of the PES.  
The reasons for these bad experiences with employers‟ actual contact with PES 
are thus similar to those behind the negative perceptions and prejudices reported in 
the previous sections. The generalisability of these accounts can naturally be debated. 
Are most unemployed really not motivated? Do PES personnel in general not know 
the needs of employers? And are PES typically too bureaucratic? The validity of 
these statements is also debatable. It might be easy for employers to say that a 
negative experience is caused by the employee and not the company itself. But 
theoretically, this might not be of much real importance; to quote the famous 
Thomas Theorem: „If men define situations as real, they are real in their 
consequences‟ (Thomas & Thomas 1928). Thus, if employers define these situations 
as real, it is very likely that PES will lose any chance of a good reputation, which is 
the only way to be perceived as a trustworthy third party. 
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Conclusion and implications  
 
In recent years there has been a strong emphasis on the organisational setup of 
PES: Their organisation may be too bureaucratic, frontline personnel not competent 
enough, or their resources insufficient. By contrast, this paper has focused on the 
environment in which PES work. Our argument is that PES‟ failure as efficient job 
brokers originates in the very nature of the labour market. It is plagued by what we 
label the double-sided asymmetric information problem: Employers try to avoid the 
worst employees but this is difficult because the information is asymmetrically 
distributed: The worker is better informed about his or her own capabilities. At the 
same time, employees try to avoid the worst employers, but this is also difficult 
because, again, the information is asymmetrically distributed: The employer is better 
informed about the real work conditions he or she offers. And both have an 
incentive to present their labour or respectively their workplace in the best possible 
light, which the other party naturally expects. This situation does create a need for a 
third party. However, it is very difficult for the PES to function as that reliable third 
party, for the reasons we have discussed in the previous sections. Our prediction is 
that PES will usually be used by both employers and employees only as a last resort, 
and therefore  they get caught in the low-end equilibrium that seems almost 
impossible to escape.  
These mechanisms have been illustrated by means of 40 in-depth interviews with 
private employers in six different European countries. The employees‟ perceptions of 
PES were outside the scope of this paper. To study best the problem of PES, we 
focused on unskilled labour. The interviews confirmed that employers perceived PES 
as a last resort for getting labour. Most of the employers had negative perceptions of 
the unemployed handled by PES. The fact that these persons had to rely on the PES 
was often considered a bad signal and their work motivation was questioned. It was 
also shown that most employers felt they could not trust the information given by 
PES. The employers questioned the ability of PES to select motivated from non-
motivated workers, and many feared that the PES would not tell the whole story on a 
given applicant. The data material also indicates that employers who had used PES 
often had negative experiences, either with the provided applicants or with PES 
administrative procedures. The latter finding indicates that the organisational 
problems of the PES are probably not negligible. 
Our argument carries some implications for the role of PES as job brokers. One 
possibility would be just to maintain the contemporary setup and let PES continue to 
function as a last resort for both employers and employees. In such a scenario, PES 
should be seen as institutions that try to make ends meet when everything else fails. 
Our findings suggest that within such an organisational setup, frontline personnel 
can potentially improve PES‟ function as job-brokers by establishing a good 
reputation. A Swiss study actually claims that the probability of an unemployed 
person finding an occupation through PES is three percent higher when PES 
caseworkers establish and maintain direct contact with employers (Behncke et al. 
2007). However, the question is naturally whether it is worth the effort. It is 
extremely difficult to make a cost-benefit analysis in this field. But our interviews 
indicate that – at least within the current organisational setup – this positive 
reputation effect has a modest potential.  
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A second possibility would be to free PES from the mandate of conducting 
work tests and/or the task of helping the weakest workers, focusing only on best 
jobseekers. Our interviews did reveal that in two cases (in Italy and Germany) the 
employers were satisfied with PES because staff had been able and willing to make a 
tough pre-selection to find the required very specific type of workforce. The problem 
with this option – which basically imposes the logic of private agencies on PES – is 
that with work tests not conducted, the weakest workers risk being left without any 
help. Also, one could question the wisdom of spending public resources on 
facilitating job matches between the most productive workers and the best 
employers. 
A third possibility is to (re-)establish a public monopoly on job-brokering. This 
is a rather remote possibility as it contravenes current Europe legislation and ILO 
conventions. Furthermore, the Slovenian and Hungarian cases demonstrate that it 
not enough to pass a law that requires employers to report vacant positions to PES, 
for they can do so without ever actually hiring PES candidates. One needs to turn to 
the former communist countries to see cases of real monopoly. Until the 1990s Italy 
also was close to being a state monopoly on job-brokering. Such a monopoly can 
potentially turn PES into the dominant job-brokers, but the drawbacks of these 
systems are well-known (cf. Ichino 1982 and Ferrera and Gualmini 2004 for a 
description of the Italian system).  
 Finally, a fourth possibility is to acknowledge the doubled-sided asymmetric 
information problem and simply free PES from the task of direct job-brokering. In 
our opinion this is the most promising strategy.  However it has two severe 
implications for the wider functioning of PES: First, it alters the role of the PES in 
the administration of unemployment benefits, notably in the enforcement of 
workfare policy. If PES are no longer asked to deliver concrete vacancies, the work 
test needs to be replaced with a „search test‟, wherein benefit claimants are required 
to document that they are actively looking for a job. Second, it alters the task of 
helping the weakest jobseekers. In such a setup it is no more a matter of sending 
weak jobseekers to vacant positions which PES have in stock. Such weak workers are 
probably better off anyway without the stigma of being sent by the PES. Instead, the 
PES will now try to help disadvantaged workers to requalify, use the informal 
channels of recruitment, and  access job information through nationwide on-line 
databases, etc. Another useful tool is to give employers wage subsidies for a limited 
period if they hire a person from a disadvantaged group. These programs have in 
some countries shown positive results (e.g. Larsen 2002), for which the most obvious 
explanation is that they (using Akerlof‟s terms) allow both employers and workers to 
take a longer „test drive‟. These programs potentially create informal networks which 
have proved effective in mitigating the doubled-sided asymmetric information 
problem. 
In conclusion, our findings do not lead to a single best solution to how to better 
organise PES. The paper suggests to reconsider some of the PES‟s historical 
functions, notably direct job placement and unemployment benefit administration 
through work test. The argument is that PES, since their very creation, have had to 
deal with dilemmas which recent policy developments just seem to have worsened. 
However, recognising these dilemmas might help to qualify the discussion of PES‟ 
function as job-brokers.   
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1 The empirical research has been financed by the 7th Framework Program „Reconciling work and 
welfare in Europe‟ (RECWOWE). The interviews were conducted by a research team composed of 
Giuliano Bonoli, Karl Hinrichs, Miroljub Ignjatovic, Vera Messing, Jacob J. Pedersen, Nevenka Sadar 
and Valeria Sparano. We gratefully thank all participants for making their data available and for their 
comments on previous versions of this paper. 
 
2 Labour market exchanges were firstly created by private organizations in many European cities such 
as Berlin (1883), Vienna (1885), Amsterdam (1886), Paris and Bern (1887) and Brussels (1888) (Mosley 
and Speckesser 1997). The fist nation-wide public placement services was however created in the UK 
in 1910. 
 
3 See e.g. the Unemployment Convention  (n. 2, 1919) ; the Free Charging Employment Agencies 
Convention (n. 34, 1933); the 1948 Employment Services Convention (n. 88, 1948); the Free Charging 
Employment Agencies Convention (revised, n. 96, 1949). 
 
4 See e.g. the Private Employment Agencies Convention (n. 181), June 1997. 
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Appendix A – List of interviews and background information  
 
Identification Country Branche Sector Number of employed 
HU 1  Hungary Cleaning Service 8 
HU 2 Hungary Supermarket Service 8 
HU 3  Hungary Security Guards and Cleaning Service 50 
HU 4  Hungary Food Service 5315 
HU 5  Hungary Construction Industry 15 
HU 6 Hungary Electronics Industry 2700 
HU 7  Hungary Tires Industry 1250 
CH 1  Switzerland Metal Industry 85 
CH 2 Switzerland Cleaning Service 180 
CH 3  Switzerland Painting Industry 43 
CH 4  Switzerland Manufacturing Machines Industry 2057 
CH 5  Switzerland Supermarket Service 7500 
CH 6 Switzerland Food Service 230 
CH7  Switzerland Construction Industry 200 
IT 1 Italy Beverage Industry 386 
IT 2  Italy Catering Service 970 
IT3  Italy Typography Industry 620 
IT 4 Italy Automotive Industry 120 
IT 5  Italy Electronics Industry 22 
IT 6  Italy Clothing Outlet Service 85 
IT 7  Italy Call Centre Service 1000 
DK 1  Denmark Supermarket Service 65 
DK 2  Denmark Supermarket Service 210 
DK 3  Denmark Food Industry 77 
DK 4  Denmark Manufacturing Machines Industry 603 
DK 5  Denmark Food Industry 350 
DK 6 Denmark Cleaning Service 33 
SL 1  Slovenia textile sanitary/hygienic Industry 558 
SL 2  Slovenia Cleaning Service 80 
SL 3  Slovenia Supermarket Service 12000 
SL 4  Slovenia household appliances Industry 5000 
SL 5  Slovenia Cleaning Service 6 
SL 6  Slovenia packing materials Industry 62 
GE 1  Germany Cleaning Service 2500 
GE 2 Germany Food Industry 780 
GE 3 Germany Cleaning Service 75 
GE 4  Germany Supermarket Service 89 
GE 5  Germany Supermarket Service 28 
GE 6  Germany Food Industry 350 
GE 7  Germany Food Industry 100 
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Appendix B – Questionnaire 
 
 
1. How many employees do you have at this workplace? (Workplace defined as 
the geographical unit for which the human resources person is responsible)  
______________ 
 
2. How many employees‟ are unskilled workers (workers who have less than 
one and a half year of occupational training)?  
______________ 
 
3. How long does a typical unskilled worker stay at the workplace? 
____________ years _____________ months 
 
4. How often does the workplace recruit unskilled workers though the 
following channels? (not how they announce the position – but how they 
actually typically establish the contact) 
 
 Very 
often 
Often Rarely Never Do not 
know 
Through Newspapers and other 
written media 
O O O O O 
Through internet tools provided 
by public employment agency 
O O O O O 
Through the internet tools  
provided by non-public agencies 
O O O O O 
Through current employees O O O O O 
Through other contacts in the 
sector 
O O O O O 
Through public employment 
agencies 
O O O O O 
Through private employment 
agencies 
O O O O O 
Through waiting list or direct 
application 
O O O O O 
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5. How important for employment chances of unskilled workers are a positive 
recommendation from …  
 
 Of very 
high 
importance 
Of high 
importance 
Of some 
importance 
Of no 
importance 
Do not 
know 
… own 
employees 
O O O O O 
… former 
employers 
(written) 
O O O O O 
… former 
employers 
(oral) 
O O O O O 
… private 
employmen
t agencies 
O O O O O 
… public 
employmen
t agencies 
O O O O O 
 
 
6. If you need to lay off an unskilled  worker who creates problems, would you 
say that this is… 
 
… very difficult O 
… difficult  O 
…. easy O 
…. very easy 
 
O 
 
 
7. How is a unskilled worker at your workplace typically protected from being 
made redundant? 
 
Open answer 
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8. When you have a vacancy for a low skill worker, how often do you announce 
it to the public employment agency? 
 
o Always 
o Often 
o sometimes, 
o rarely 
o never 
 
 
9. Why do you not use the public employment agency more often? 
 
Open answer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction: 
There are a number of groups of unemployed who sometimes face difficulties in 
the labour market. We would like to hear your judgement about different groups of 
unemployed.  
 
 
10. Do you think there are special risks when hiring unemployed above 50 years? 
 
Open answer 
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11. Do you think there are special risks when hiring unemployed from ethnic 
minorities? 
 
Open answer  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. Do you think there are special risks when hiring unemployed, who have been 
unemployed a year or more? 
 
Open answer  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13. Are there other categories of workers that may represent a special risk? 
 
Open answer 
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14. Among those people belonging to these groups, there are certainly some who 
could do a good job. How do you try to spot them?  
 
Open answer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15. Have the workplace within the last two years hired workers, which came 
from unemployment and was above 50? 
 
Yes O 
No O 
Do not know O 
 
If yes: How many ?  ………………………  
 
 
16. Have the workplace within the last two years hired workers, which came 
from unemployment and belonged to an ethnic minority group? 
 
Yes O 
No O 
Do not know O 
 
If yes: How many ?  ………………………  
 
 
17. Have the workplace within the last two years hired workers, which had been 
unemployed for over a year? 
 
Yes O 
No O 
Do not know O 
 
If yes: How many ?  ………………………  
 
  
Larsen, Vesan:  The failure of placement of low-skill workers     27  
 
Introduction:  
Even though there are special risks connected to hiring long-term unemployed, 
older unemployed and unemployed from ethnic minority groups some workplaces 
do recruit from these groups. In the following we like to hear what potentially could 
make your workplace more willing to take the risk of hiring from these groups.   
 
 
18. What could make your company willing to take the risk of hiring people from 
these groups? 
 
Open answer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19. How could the public employment offices possibly help these groups into 
employment? 
 
Open answer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20. Would it increase the employment chances of these groups if the 
employment office could offer a publicly financed trial period? 
 
Open answer – follow why would that help? Or why would that not help? 
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21. How do you regard participation in a labour market programme by an 
unemployed? Is it a positive factor?  
 
Open answer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22. Would it increase the employment chances of these groups if it was easier for 
the company to fire workers? 
 
Open answer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23. Would it increase the employment chances of these groups if it were possible 
not to directly hire people of these groups, but to only rent their service 
through public/private employment agencies?  
 
Open answer 
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24. Would it increase the employment chances of these groups if it were possible 
for employers to take advantage, if necessary, of follow up service aimed at 
solving possible problems? 
 
Open answer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25. Do you have other central insights that relate to this theme? 
 
Open answer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for the interview  
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